Synaesthesia and the Encounter with Other Assignment

Synaesthesia and the Encounter with Other - Assignment Example   What Abram is trying to say in this passage is how humans can speak to innate objects such as trees and rocks. To most people, this just sounds insane and it clearly shows how humans have become alienated with nature. In ancient time, our ancestors used to communicate with nature and this kept them in touch with their inner self. However, due to the advent of alphabets and farming conversations with other species or nature has become outdated. This dependence to nature is evident on all the continents of the world by the varied forms of identification but is usually referred to as totemism. Abram further argues his point by saying, â€Å"the articulate speech of trees or mountains† is due to human engagement with nature via the synaesthetic convergence of two forms of senses, mainly hearing and seeing. The reason why the argument is important to him is that imaginary distortion such as conversations with trees is the very structure of perception. This is because the imagin ative interaction of human senses during their everyday encounters is the only way for them to link ourselves with nature and hence letting nature weave into our experiences. This means that all the inert objects that surround us in life are both powerful and expressive entities. I agree with his point of view since imagination and emotion are an important part of human understanding. This is because that which humans perceive through their senses will invoke further understanding through emotion and imagination.   

Voluntary Disclosure Behaviour of Kuwait Companies

Voluntary Disclosure Behaviour of Kuwait Companies BACKGROUND OF STUDY 1.1 Introduction Disclosure of information in corporate annual reports has attracted a number of researchers in both developed and developing countries. The voluntary disclosure information in excess of mandatory disclosure, has been receiving an increasing amount of attention in recent accounting studies. Because of the inadequacy of compulsory information, the demand for voluntary disclosure provides investors with the necessary information to make more informed decisions (Alsaeed, 2006). Voluntary disclosure of decision-useful corporate information is considered to be the first step in solving the alleged problems of traditional financial reporting (Leadbetter, 2000). Its objectives are well defined: closing (or narrowing) the gap between a companys potential intrinsic market value and its current market value. Voluntary disclosure, in the context of globalization of the worlds financial markets, has received a great deal of attention in the accounting literature in recent years (Hossain, Berera and Rahman, 1995). This is due to the following reasons: Firstly, additional disclosures may help to attract new shareholders thereby helping to maintain a healthy demand for shares, and a share price that more fully reflects its intrinsic value. It is possible that poor disclosure could lead to an undervalued share making it attractive to a potential predator. Secondly, increased information may assist in reducing informational risk and thereby lower the cost of capital (Spero, 1979). A lower cost of capital should mean that marginal projects become profitable. Thirdly, in order to raise capital on the markets, companies will increase their voluntary disclosure. Consequently, listed companies are more likely to have a higher level of disclosure than unlisted companies and multiple listed companies those raising capital on the international markets will have a higher level of disclosure than domestically listed companies. Fourthly, multiple listed companies often have an interest in foreign capital markets since foreign operations are often financed by foreign capital (Choi and Mueller, 1984). Disclosure levels might be increased to adapt to local customs to meet the requirements of banks and other suppliers of capital; finally, listed and multiple listed companies might increase their social responsibility disclosures to demonstrate that they act responsibly (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979). Companies may have attained their status on the securities markets and be able to attract new funds, not least because they act responsibly. According to Healy and Palepu (2001) a companys disclosure decision could be a response to innovation, globalization or changes in business and capital market environments. Kuwait is the focus of this study for three reasons. First, Kuwait is a small rich country, relatively open economy with crude oil reserves of about 10% of world reserves. Second, over the last decade, the Kuwaiti government has initiated several far-reaching reforms at the Kuwait Stock Exchange to mobilize domestic savings and attract foreign capital investment. These measures include privatization of state corporations through the stock exchange and allowing foreign investors to own shares in the listed companies since 2000, tax free. Third, the Kuwait Stock Exchange is becoming an important capital market in the region. It is ranked the second largest market in the Arab world (after Saudi Arabia) in terms of total market capitalization. Its total market capitalization was US$128,951 million as of December 2006 (Arab Monetary Fund 2006). These reasons could motivate investors to diversify their investment portfolios into that market. As a result, investors may be interested in the information disclosure practices of listed companies in Kuwait (Al-Shammari, 2008). 1-2 Problem Statement Many developing countries strive to mobilize financial resources from domestic as well as international sources with a view to attaining their economic and social development goals. Domestic and international investors utilize financial and non-financial information available on potential investment targets for assessing risk and making critical investment decisions. Thus, the availability of financial and non-financial information in sufficient quantity and of sufficient quality has an important bearing on efforts geared towards mobilizing investment for financing economic and social development. Adequate reporting and disclosure of financial and non-financial information will reduce asymmetric information problem, hence are likely to improve investor confidence and a lower cost of investment. According to Gray, Meeks and Roberts (1995) investors demand information to assess the timing and uncertainty of current and future cash flows so that they may value firms and make other investment decisions such as choosing a portfolio of securities. Companies satisfy this demand in part by supplying voluntary accounting information, thereby enabling them to raise capital on the best available terms (Gray et al., 1995). Given the faster pace of globalization, the growing interdependence of international financial markets and increased mobility of capital, developing countries need to attach greater importance to corporate transparency and disclosure. Policy makers, legislators and regulators, in recognition of the significant influence that corporate transparency has on decisions of investors, need to strengthen further the various components of corporate disclosure infrastructure so that domestic and international resources are mobilized more efficiently. Kuwait is one of the developing countries that face difficulties to attract foreign investments. Birgit Ebner at Germanys Frankfurt Trust, who helps manage a Middle Eastern stock fund, said Kuwait was not an attractive investment compared with others in the region (www.gulfnews.com). One of the main reasons that interpret this matter is the absence of voluntary disclosure as a result of sharp low supply of information by companies. According to Birgit Ebner, We are underweight in Kuwait because in Kuwait there are many holding firms dominating the market. And on top of it, the transparency is currently lower than in other Gulf States. In opinion of many analysts in Kuwait, the problem of gulf bank is related to absence of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Kuwait stock exchange report that issued in (2007) revealed that 156 companies listed in Kuwait stock exchange from among 177 companies listed in Kuwait stock exchange are violating disclosure guidelines (www.alaswaq.net 2007). The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the influence of several firm characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure of companies listed in Kuwait and whether disclosure level improves over the years given changes in the accounting environment of the country and globalization that have taken placed. There are many studies have examined the relationship between a company`s characteristics and the level of disclosure in both developed and developing countries such as Canada (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978); United Kingdom (Firth, 1979, 1980); Nigeria (Wallace, 1987); Sweden (Cooke, 1989); Japan (Cooke, 1992); United States (Imhoff, 1992; and Lang and Lundholm, 1993); Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994); Switzerland (Raffournier, 1995); Hong Kong (Wallace and Naser, 1995), Egypt (Mahmood, 1999); Jordan (Naser, Alkhatib and Karbhari, 2002); Saudi Arabia (Alsaeed, 2006b) and United Arab Emirates (Aljifri, 2007). However, to my knowledge, little attention has been devoted to the role of voluntary disclosure in the Middle East countries, more specifically Kuwait (see Al-Shammari, 2008). The aim of this study is to understand what motivate or demonstrate a companys disclosure by empirically investigate the association between a number of company characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of companies listed in the Kuwait Stock Exchange in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. In addition, the influence of the reporting year on voluntary disclosure will also be examined to assess the progress of disclosure activities in Kuwait. Given that Ashammaris study only cover the year of 2005, the execution of this study is fully justified. 1.3 Research Questions In general, this study seeks for explanation on voluntary disclosure behaviour of Kuwait companies. The followings are the research questions:- 1- What is the relationship between the firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion, profitability, audit firm size, industry sector and voluntary disclosure level? 2- Does reporting year influences voluntary disclosure? 3- To what extent do the above factors affect the voluntary disclosure? 1.4 Research Objectives To determine the influences of firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion, profitability, audit firm size, industry sector and reporting year on the level of voluntary disclosure of companies listed in Kuwait. 1.5 Significance of the Study The significance of study can be viewed from contributions given to Accounting academic discipline and to the practitioners and policymakers. Contribution to Accounting body of knowledge This study contributes to the literature on corporate financial reporting and disclosure practices in one of the important capital markets in the Middle East in which International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) are mandatory and the government controls the accounting and auditing profession. It also contributes to the corporate governance literature on whether the company characteristics found to be significant in companies operating in developed countries are similar to those a developing country like Kuwait. This study is important in enhancing our understanding of corporate financial reporting in Kuwait. It explores the determinants that help explain voluntary disclosure in Kuwait. Contribution to the practitioners and policy makers Knowledge on firms characteristics that influence voluntary disclosure would enable policy makers to target training and monitoring activities to suitable target companies in order to improve disclosure level in the country. This is important because higher disclosure among companies could improve investors confidence and help attracting more foreign investment into the country. The study is also able to show whether the external environment in Kuwait have improved the voluntary disclosure activities. 1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study This study investigates the relationship between firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure of non financial companies listed in Kuwait. Financial companies (banks and insurance companies) were eliminated as the characteristics of their financial reports are different from those of non financial firms (Alsaeed, 2006). A disclosure index was constructed as a yardstick to measure the level of disclosure by the listed firms. The construction of the disclosure index is based on the information that firms supply in their annual financial reports to shareholders. Albeit not as conclusive, financial reports serve as a widely accepted (Knutson, 1992). The disclosure index does not intend to be comprehensive, nor does it intend to specify what firms ought to disclose. Rather, the index is crafted solely for the purpose of capturing and measuring differences in disclosure practices among firms. The selection of items embedded into the index was entirely guided by Meek, Rober and Gray (1995), Botosan (1997), Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) and Alsaeed (2006) 1.7 Organization of the Study The reminder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter Two discusses the literature review related to the study; Chapter Three consists of research methodology including theoretical framework, hypothesis development and model specification for the study. The measurement, sampling and instrumentations are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter Four presents the empirical findings and results. Finally, Chapter Five provides the discussion, implications and recommendation of the study as well as suggestions for future research. CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Introduction This Chapter discusses and summarizes the literatures review, which looks at many aspects of voluntary disclosure and the factors which affect the degree of voluntary disclosure in a firm. The discussion is segmented into five sections. The first section presents an overview of disclosure requirements in Kuwait so as to provide foundation knowledge of the issue understudy. Section two discusses the concept and measurement of voluntary disclosure. This is followed by section three which presents the firm-related determinants of voluntary disclosure as found from prior theoretical and empirical literature. These variables include firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion, profitability, audit firm size. 2.2 Disclosure Requirement in Kuwait Mandatory disclosure refers to firms disclose information about their operations because of legal requirements. For the efficiency of markets and the protection of investors, mandatory disclosure of information concerning the firms operating in capital markets has important consequences (Shin, 1998). 2.3 Voluntary disclosure level More detailed disclosure by the firms beyond the level of information disclosed within the mandatory disclosure process is called voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure means making public the financial and non-financial information regarding the firms operations without any legal requirement (Fishman and Hagerty (1997), Meek et al. (1995), Botosan (1997), Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) and Alsaeed (2006). Alsaeed has identified a more comprehensive items for voluntary disclosure based on Meek et al. (1995), Botosan (1997), Naser and Nuseibeh (2003). These items are as in Table 2.1 Table 2.1: Voluntary disclosure items in Alsaeed (2006) No. Disclosure items 1 Strategic information 2 Brief history of company 3 Information on events affecting future years results 4 Board directors names 5 Top managements names 6 Majority shareholders 7 Information on different types of products 8 Information statistics for more than two years 9 Information on dividends policy 10 Information on future expansion projects 11 Percentage of foreign and national labor force 12 Information on training and workers development 13 Information on social and environmental activities 14 Statement of corporate goals and objectives 15 Principle markets 16 Average compensation per employee 17 Market share 18 Information on events affecting current years results 19 Competitive environment 20 Forecasted profits Many studies have examined the relationship between a companys characteristics and voluntary disclosure level. Alsaeed, (2006) argued that firm size, profitability and auditor firm size influence the level of voluntary disclosure. Naser et al., (2002), Jensen and Meckling, (1976); Fama and Jensen, (1983) Donnelly and Mulcahy, (2008), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), studied the association between companys firm size, debt ratio, owner ship and auditor firm size and the level of disclosure. 2.4 Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure 2.4.1 Firm size Most of the firm disclosure studies used firm size as a control variable (see for example, Alsaeed (2006); Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008); Brammer and Pavelin (2004); Meek et al, (1995), Mitchell et al, (1995), Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, (1993), Aitken et al. (1997), Bradbury, (1992), Zarzeski (1996), Brennan and Hourigan, (2000), Naser et al.,(2002), Wallace and Naser (1995), Firth, (1979), Eng and Mak (2003) and Hossain et al.(1994). Many studies found a positive relationship between firm size and disclosure level of companies. For example, Alsaeed (2006) conducted a study to investigate the relationship between firm characteristics of non-financial Saudi firms listed on the Saudi Stock Market in 2003 and voluntary disclosure level by those companies. He found that there was a positive relationship between the firm size and the level of disclosure. Alsaeed (2006) argues that agency costs are higher for larger companies because shareholders are widespread, therefore, additional disclosure might reduce these costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). This finding is consistent with other studies such as Meek et al, (1995), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Foster (1986), Hossain et al, (1995) and Al-Shammari, (2008). In addition to what Alsaeed (2006) has mentioned above, they argued that large companies might have sufficient resources to afford the cost of producing information or the user of annual reports. Secondly, small companies might suffer from a competitive disadvantage if they provide additional disclosure. Thirdly, large companies might be of interest to different users of annual reports including government agencies. 2.4.2 Debt ratio There is no consensus among researchers about the relationship between debt ratio and voluntary disclosure. Most of studies found a significant positive relationship between debt ratio and voluntary disclosure such as Naser (1998), Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995); Hossain et al. (1995), Al-Shammari, (2008) and Bradbury, (1992). Jensen and Meckling, (1976) found the voluntary disclosure level can reduce the agency costs by facilitating debt ratio suppliers assessment of the firms to ability to meet its debts ratio. In relation to this, Al-Shimmiri, (2008) argued that the companies with higher debt in their structure of capital are prone to higher agency cost, hence they will be more likely to disclose additional information in order to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry with shareholders. Alsaeed, (2006) argued that when firms increase their level of leverage, they have to disclose more information in order to reduce asymmetric information between the firm and its creditors. Hence he argued that firms with high leverage will have high level of disclosure. In addition, Zarzeski (1996) argued that firms with higher debt ratio are more likely to share private information with their creditors. Thus, voluntary disclosures can be expected to increase with leverage. However, Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, (1993), Hossain, Berera and Rahman (1994), Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997), Brennan and Hourigan, (2000) and Eng and Mak (2003) studied the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and leverage found no relationship. While Meek et al (1995) mention that there is negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and leverage for US, UK, and European MNCs, Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994). 2.4.3 Profitability Many studies refer the profitability as the factor that affects voluntary disclosure level such as Singhvi and Desai (1971); Foster (1986), Richard (1992), Meek et al. (1995) and Naser et al. (2002) they argues that when the level of firms profitability increase, the firms have to disclose more information that can be an indicator to good management and also have incentives to show to the investors and the public that their profitability has increased. However, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) identified 12 studies that investigated the relationship between profitability and disclosure with mixed results. Akerlof (1970) argued that larger profitable companies may disclose more information to be distinguished from less profitable companies. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argued the firms with larger profits are more interested in disclosing detailed information in their annual reports in order to justify their financial performance and to reduce political costs. However Wallace et al. (1994) found no significant relationship between the comprehensiveness of disclosure and the profit margin of listed and unlisted Spanish firms. Inchausti (1997) elaborated that agency theory suggests that managers of larger profitable companies may wish to disclose more information in order to obtain personal advantages like continuance of their management position and compensation. Raffournier (1995), Wallace and Naser (1995) and Alsaeed, (2006) observed no significant relationship between the disclosure and the profitability, because none of the performance related variables provides an explanation of the disclosure level. Ho and Wong (2001), Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006) and Barako (2007) on the other hand found profitability to be positively and significantly related with two of the four disclosure categories, financial and forward looking disclosures, whereas other categories ware negative and significant with the disclosure of general and strategic. This result is similar with that of Eng and Mak (2002) study on Singapore listed companies. For example, companies in the manufacturing sector were found to disclose less of financial information, and instead disclosed more on general and strategic information to explain in detail factors affecting their poor financial performance. 2.4.4 Ownership dispersion The ownership dispersion represents the percentage of shares owned by outsider after subtracting shares owned by the insider. Many studies found positive relationship between voluntary disclosure level and ownership, as explained by the agency theory which suggests that difference in the proportion of the companys shares owned by outsider shareholders causes differences in the voluntary disclosure level. This is because the companies with more outsider ownership are more likely to disclose more information than companies with less outsider ownership and also the demand for publicly available information is likely to increase (Wallace and Naser 1995). Gelb (2000) and Barako et al. (2006) found significant relationship between outsider ownership and disclosure level. Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981), Fama and Jensen (1983), Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, (1993) and Aitken et al. (1997) mentioned the detailed disclosure in annual reports that may allow outsider to monitor their interests more efficiently. Eng and Mak (2003) argued that voluntary disclosure is a substitute for outside monitoring and so is negatively related to managerial ownership. They found evidence consistent with this prediction. Many studies found negative relationship between voluntary disclosure level and ownership dispersion. Hossain et al. (1994) found evidence on Malaysian listed companies having significant negative association between voluntary disclosure and ownership dispersion. A later study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) also found similar result. Naser et al. (2002) examined the affect of ownership on US companys disclosure and his results indicated that firms with a lower level of managerial ownership are more likely to receive higher ratings for the disclosure provided in their financial reports. Ho and Wong (2001) found negative relationship between family ownership structure and voluntary disclosure. Chau and Gray (2002) also found negative relationship between family ownership structure and voluntary disclosure of companies listed in Hong Kong and Singapore but found positive associated with outside ownership. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) on the other hand found no evidence that ownership structure is related to disclosure level. 2.4.5 Audit firm size According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) large audit firms act as a mechanism to reduce agency costs and exert more of a monitoring role by limiting opportunistic behavior by managers and are less likely to be associated with clients that disclose lower levels of information in their annual reports. In terms of size, audit firms can be divided into two; large or small. Large audit firms are identified as being one of these Big Four (or Big Five or Six formerly) international auditing firms, and smaller audit firms are the rest; the firms are more likely to choose a Big Six auditing firm. Such choice of audit firms signals to investors that the contents of the annual reports are audited with high quality (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). Furthermore, the large audit firms are widely spread in the world while small firms are domestically; hence the large audit firms have more capability to disclosure of the information and have higher reputation and power to affect the voluntary disclosure level related to the smaller audit firm (Alsaeed, 2006). Several studies found that audit firm size have significant relationship with voluntary disclosure level. Firth (1979), Craswell and Taylor (1992), Wallace and Naser, (1995), Ahmed (1995), Raffournier (1995), Inchausti (1997), Mahmood (1999), S.M. Ho and Wong (2001), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Nasser et al. (2002) and Al-Shammari, (2008) found significant relationship between the voluntary disclosure level and audit firm size. Forker (1992) and Wallace et al. (1994) claim there are positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and audit firm size but not significant, while Hossain et al. (1994), Raffournier (1995), Wallace and Naser (1995), Depoers (2000) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) they didnt fine significant association. 2.4.6 Industry sector According Cook (1989) disclosure level is more likely to vary from one industry to the other due to the likelihood that leading firms operating in a particularindustry could produce a bandwagon effect on the level ofdisclosure adopted by other firms working in the same industry. Cooke (1992) found evidence that Japanese manufacturing firms tend to provide more information than other non-manufacturing firms. Other studies that found significant effect of industry types are Wallace and Naser (1995) and Camfferman and Cooke (2002), while McNally et al.(1982); Wallace (1987): Wallace et al. (1994); Raffournier (1995); Inchausti, (1997); Patton and Zelenka (1997); Naser (1998); Owusu-Ansah (1998), Naser and Alkhatib (2000) and Alsaeed (2006) found insignificant effect. Table 2.2: Summary of independent variables influence on voluntary disclosure: Study Independent variable findings Akerlof (1970) Profitability Positive relationship Singhvi and Desai, (1971) Profitability Positive relationship Jensen and Meckling, (1976) Debt ratio and audit firm size Positive relationship with debt ratio and audit firm size. Firth, (1979) Firm size and audit firm size Positive relationship with debt ratio and audit firm size. Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) Ownership dispersion positive relationship with ownership dispersion McNally et al.(1982) Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector Fama and Jensen (1983) Ownership dispersion positive relationship with ownership dispersion Watts and Zimmerman (1983). Firm size positive relationship with firm size Foster, (1986) Firm size, profitability Significant positive with firm size and found positive with profitability. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) Profitability positive with profitability Wallace (1987) Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Cook (1989) Industry sector Positive with industry sector. Bradbury (1992) Firm size and debt ratio. Significant positive with firm size and debt ratio. Richard, (1992) Profitability Positive with profitability. Forker (1992) Audit firm size Positive but insignificant with audit firm size. Craswell and Taylor (1992) Audit firm size Positively significant with audit firm size. Cooke (1992) Industry sector positive with industry sector Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, (1993) Firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion. Positive with firm size and ownership dispersion and negative with debt ratio. Hossain et al. (1994) Firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion and audit firm size. Positive with firm size and ownership dispersion but negatively with debt ratio and audit firm size. Wallace et al. (1994) Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Meek et al, (1995) Firm size, debt ratio, profitability. Positive with firm size and profitability whereas significant, negative with debt ratio. Hossain et al. (1995) Firm size and Debt ratio Significant positive with firm size and debt ratio. Mitchell et al. (1995) Firm size and Debt ratio. Significant positive with firm size and debt ratio. Wallace and Naser (1995) Firm size, profitability, Ownership dispersion Positive with firm size, ownership dispersion and industry sector but- ,audit firm size and industry sector Negatively with profitability and audit firm size. Ahmed (1995) Firm size and audit firm size Positive significant with firm size and audit firm size. Raffournier (1995) Profitability, audit firm size and industry sector. No significant with profitability and industry sector, but significant positive with audit firm size Zarzeski (1996) Firm size and debt ratio Positive with firm size and debt ratio Aitken et al. (1997) Firm size, Debt ratio and owner ship dispersion Positive with the firm size and ownership dispersion but negative with debt ratio. Inchausti (1997) Profitability, audit firm size and industry sector. Positive with profitability and significant positive with audit firm size and insignificant with industry sector. Patton and Zelenka (1997) Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Naser (1998) Debt ratio and industry sector. Significant positive with debt ratio but insignificant with industry sector. Owusu-Ansah (1998), Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Mahmood (1999) Audit firm size Significant with audit firm size. Brennan and Hourigan, (2000) Firm size and debt ratio. Significant positive with firm size and significant negative with debt ratio. Gelb (2000) Ownership dispersion Negatively with Ownership dispersion Depoers (2000) Audit firm size No significant with audit firm size. Naser and Alkhatib (2000) industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Ho and Wong (2001) Profitability, ownership dispersion and audit firm size. No significant with profitability but negatively with ownership dispersion and positive significant with audit firm size. Naser et al. (2002). Firm size, Profitability, ownership dispersion and audit firm size. Positive significant with firm size and audit firm size but positive with profitability and no significant with ownership dispersion. Eng and Mak (2002) Profitability No significant with profitability Chau and Gray (2002) Ownership dispersion Positively with outside ownership dispersion. Camfferman and Cooke (2002) Profitability, audit firm size and industry sector Voluntary Disclosure Behaviour of Kuwait Companies Voluntary Disclosure Behaviour of Kuwait Companies BACKGROUND OF STUDY 1.1 Introduction Disclosure of information in corporate annual reports has attracted a number of researchers in both developed and developing countries. The voluntary disclosure information in excess of mandatory disclosure, has been receiving an increasing amount of attention in recent accounting studies. Because of the inadequacy of compulsory information, the demand for voluntary disclosure provides investors with the necessary information to make more informed decisions (Alsaeed, 2006). Voluntary disclosure of decision-useful corporate information is considered to be the first step in solving the alleged problems of traditional financial reporting (Leadbetter, 2000). Its objectives are well defined: closing (or narrowing) the gap between a companys potential intrinsic market value and its current market value. Voluntary disclosure, in the context of globalization of the worlds financial markets, has received a great deal of attention in the accounting literature in recent years (Hossain, Berera and Rahman, 1995). This is due to the following reasons: Firstly, additional disclosures may help to attract new shareholders thereby helping to maintain a healthy demand for shares, and a share price that more fully reflects its intrinsic value. It is possible that poor disclosure could lead to an undervalued share making it attractive to a potential predator. Secondly, increased information may assist in reducing informational risk and thereby lower the cost of capital (Spero, 1979). A lower cost of capital should mean that marginal projects become profitable. Thirdly, in order to raise capital on the markets, companies will increase their voluntary disclosure. Consequently, listed companies are more likely to have a higher level of disclosure than unlisted companies and multiple listed companies those raising capital on the international markets will have a higher level of disclosure than domestically listed companies. Fourthly, multiple listed companies often have an interest in foreign capital markets since foreign operations are often financed by foreign capital (Choi and Mueller, 1984). Disclosure levels might be increased to adapt to local customs to meet the requirements of banks and other suppliers of capital; finally, listed and multiple listed companies might increase their social responsibility disclosures to demonstrate that they act responsibly (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979). Companies may have attained their status on the securities markets and be able to attract new funds, not least because they act responsibly. According to Healy and Palepu (2001) a companys disclosure decision could be a response to innovation, globalization or changes in business and capital market environments. Kuwait is the focus of this study for three reasons. First, Kuwait is a small rich country, relatively open economy with crude oil reserves of about 10% of world reserves. Second, over the last decade, the Kuwaiti government has initiated several far-reaching reforms at the Kuwait Stock Exchange to mobilize domestic savings and attract foreign capital investment. These measures include privatization of state corporations through the stock exchange and allowing foreign investors to own shares in the listed companies since 2000, tax free. Third, the Kuwait Stock Exchange is becoming an important capital market in the region. It is ranked the second largest market in the Arab world (after Saudi Arabia) in terms of total market capitalization. Its total market capitalization was US$128,951 million as of December 2006 (Arab Monetary Fund 2006). These reasons could motivate investors to diversify their investment portfolios into that market. As a result, investors may be interested in the information disclosure practices of listed companies in Kuwait (Al-Shammari, 2008). 1-2 Problem Statement Many developing countries strive to mobilize financial resources from domestic as well as international sources with a view to attaining their economic and social development goals. Domestic and international investors utilize financial and non-financial information available on potential investment targets for assessing risk and making critical investment decisions. Thus, the availability of financial and non-financial information in sufficient quantity and of sufficient quality has an important bearing on efforts geared towards mobilizing investment for financing economic and social development. Adequate reporting and disclosure of financial and non-financial information will reduce asymmetric information problem, hence are likely to improve investor confidence and a lower cost of investment. According to Gray, Meeks and Roberts (1995) investors demand information to assess the timing and uncertainty of current and future cash flows so that they may value firms and make other investment decisions such as choosing a portfolio of securities. Companies satisfy this demand in part by supplying voluntary accounting information, thereby enabling them to raise capital on the best available terms (Gray et al., 1995). Given the faster pace of globalization, the growing interdependence of international financial markets and increased mobility of capital, developing countries need to attach greater importance to corporate transparency and disclosure. Policy makers, legislators and regulators, in recognition of the significant influence that corporate transparency has on decisions of investors, need to strengthen further the various components of corporate disclosure infrastructure so that domestic and international resources are mobilized more efficiently. Kuwait is one of the developing countries that face difficulties to attract foreign investments. Birgit Ebner at Germanys Frankfurt Trust, who helps manage a Middle Eastern stock fund, said Kuwait was not an attractive investment compared with others in the region (www.gulfnews.com). One of the main reasons that interpret this matter is the absence of voluntary disclosure as a result of sharp low supply of information by companies. According to Birgit Ebner, We are underweight in Kuwait because in Kuwait there are many holding firms dominating the market. And on top of it, the transparency is currently lower than in other Gulf States. In opinion of many analysts in Kuwait, the problem of gulf bank is related to absence of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Kuwait stock exchange report that issued in (2007) revealed that 156 companies listed in Kuwait stock exchange from among 177 companies listed in Kuwait stock exchange are violating disclosure guidelines (www.alaswaq.net 2007). The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the influence of several firm characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure of companies listed in Kuwait and whether disclosure level improves over the years given changes in the accounting environment of the country and globalization that have taken placed. There are many studies have examined the relationship between a company`s characteristics and the level of disclosure in both developed and developing countries such as Canada (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978); United Kingdom (Firth, 1979, 1980); Nigeria (Wallace, 1987); Sweden (Cooke, 1989); Japan (Cooke, 1992); United States (Imhoff, 1992; and Lang and Lundholm, 1993); Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994); Switzerland (Raffournier, 1995); Hong Kong (Wallace and Naser, 1995), Egypt (Mahmood, 1999); Jordan (Naser, Alkhatib and Karbhari, 2002); Saudi Arabia (Alsaeed, 2006b) and United Arab Emirates (Aljifri, 2007). However, to my knowledge, little attention has been devoted to the role of voluntary disclosure in the Middle East countries, more specifically Kuwait (see Al-Shammari, 2008). The aim of this study is to understand what motivate or demonstrate a companys disclosure by empirically investigate the association between a number of company characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of companies listed in the Kuwait Stock Exchange in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. In addition, the influence of the reporting year on voluntary disclosure will also be examined to assess the progress of disclosure activities in Kuwait. Given that Ashammaris study only cover the year of 2005, the execution of this study is fully justified. 1.3 Research Questions In general, this study seeks for explanation on voluntary disclosure behaviour of Kuwait companies. The followings are the research questions:- 1- What is the relationship between the firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion, profitability, audit firm size, industry sector and voluntary disclosure level? 2- Does reporting year influences voluntary disclosure? 3- To what extent do the above factors affect the voluntary disclosure? 1.4 Research Objectives To determine the influences of firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion, profitability, audit firm size, industry sector and reporting year on the level of voluntary disclosure of companies listed in Kuwait. 1.5 Significance of the Study The significance of study can be viewed from contributions given to Accounting academic discipline and to the practitioners and policymakers. Contribution to Accounting body of knowledge This study contributes to the literature on corporate financial reporting and disclosure practices in one of the important capital markets in the Middle East in which International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) are mandatory and the government controls the accounting and auditing profession. It also contributes to the corporate governance literature on whether the company characteristics found to be significant in companies operating in developed countries are similar to those a developing country like Kuwait. This study is important in enhancing our understanding of corporate financial reporting in Kuwait. It explores the determinants that help explain voluntary disclosure in Kuwait. Contribution to the practitioners and policy makers Knowledge on firms characteristics that influence voluntary disclosure would enable policy makers to target training and monitoring activities to suitable target companies in order to improve disclosure level in the country. This is important because higher disclosure among companies could improve investors confidence and help attracting more foreign investment into the country. The study is also able to show whether the external environment in Kuwait have improved the voluntary disclosure activities. 1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study This study investigates the relationship between firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure of non financial companies listed in Kuwait. Financial companies (banks and insurance companies) were eliminated as the characteristics of their financial reports are different from those of non financial firms (Alsaeed, 2006). A disclosure index was constructed as a yardstick to measure the level of disclosure by the listed firms. The construction of the disclosure index is based on the information that firms supply in their annual financial reports to shareholders. Albeit not as conclusive, financial reports serve as a widely accepted (Knutson, 1992). The disclosure index does not intend to be comprehensive, nor does it intend to specify what firms ought to disclose. Rather, the index is crafted solely for the purpose of capturing and measuring differences in disclosure practices among firms. The selection of items embedded into the index was entirely guided by Meek, Rober and Gray (1995), Botosan (1997), Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) and Alsaeed (2006) 1.7 Organization of the Study The reminder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter Two discusses the literature review related to the study; Chapter Three consists of research methodology including theoretical framework, hypothesis development and model specification for the study. The measurement, sampling and instrumentations are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter Four presents the empirical findings and results. Finally, Chapter Five provides the discussion, implications and recommendation of the study as well as suggestions for future research. CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Introduction This Chapter discusses and summarizes the literatures review, which looks at many aspects of voluntary disclosure and the factors which affect the degree of voluntary disclosure in a firm. The discussion is segmented into five sections. The first section presents an overview of disclosure requirements in Kuwait so as to provide foundation knowledge of the issue understudy. Section two discusses the concept and measurement of voluntary disclosure. This is followed by section three which presents the firm-related determinants of voluntary disclosure as found from prior theoretical and empirical literature. These variables include firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion, profitability, audit firm size. 2.2 Disclosure Requirement in Kuwait Mandatory disclosure refers to firms disclose information about their operations because of legal requirements. For the efficiency of markets and the protection of investors, mandatory disclosure of information concerning the firms operating in capital markets has important consequences (Shin, 1998). 2.3 Voluntary disclosure level More detailed disclosure by the firms beyond the level of information disclosed within the mandatory disclosure process is called voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure means making public the financial and non-financial information regarding the firms operations without any legal requirement (Fishman and Hagerty (1997), Meek et al. (1995), Botosan (1997), Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) and Alsaeed (2006). Alsaeed has identified a more comprehensive items for voluntary disclosure based on Meek et al. (1995), Botosan (1997), Naser and Nuseibeh (2003). These items are as in Table 2.1 Table 2.1: Voluntary disclosure items in Alsaeed (2006) No. Disclosure items 1 Strategic information 2 Brief history of company 3 Information on events affecting future years results 4 Board directors names 5 Top managements names 6 Majority shareholders 7 Information on different types of products 8 Information statistics for more than two years 9 Information on dividends policy 10 Information on future expansion projects 11 Percentage of foreign and national labor force 12 Information on training and workers development 13 Information on social and environmental activities 14 Statement of corporate goals and objectives 15 Principle markets 16 Average compensation per employee 17 Market share 18 Information on events affecting current years results 19 Competitive environment 20 Forecasted profits Many studies have examined the relationship between a companys characteristics and voluntary disclosure level. Alsaeed, (2006) argued that firm size, profitability and auditor firm size influence the level of voluntary disclosure. Naser et al., (2002), Jensen and Meckling, (1976); Fama and Jensen, (1983) Donnelly and Mulcahy, (2008), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), studied the association between companys firm size, debt ratio, owner ship and auditor firm size and the level of disclosure. 2.4 Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure 2.4.1 Firm size Most of the firm disclosure studies used firm size as a control variable (see for example, Alsaeed (2006); Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008); Brammer and Pavelin (2004); Meek et al, (1995), Mitchell et al, (1995), Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, (1993), Aitken et al. (1997), Bradbury, (1992), Zarzeski (1996), Brennan and Hourigan, (2000), Naser et al.,(2002), Wallace and Naser (1995), Firth, (1979), Eng and Mak (2003) and Hossain et al.(1994). Many studies found a positive relationship between firm size and disclosure level of companies. For example, Alsaeed (2006) conducted a study to investigate the relationship between firm characteristics of non-financial Saudi firms listed on the Saudi Stock Market in 2003 and voluntary disclosure level by those companies. He found that there was a positive relationship between the firm size and the level of disclosure. Alsaeed (2006) argues that agency costs are higher for larger companies because shareholders are widespread, therefore, additional disclosure might reduce these costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). This finding is consistent with other studies such as Meek et al, (1995), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Foster (1986), Hossain et al, (1995) and Al-Shammari, (2008). In addition to what Alsaeed (2006) has mentioned above, they argued that large companies might have sufficient resources to afford the cost of producing information or the user of annual reports. Secondly, small companies might suffer from a competitive disadvantage if they provide additional disclosure. Thirdly, large companies might be of interest to different users of annual reports including government agencies. 2.4.2 Debt ratio There is no consensus among researchers about the relationship between debt ratio and voluntary disclosure. Most of studies found a significant positive relationship between debt ratio and voluntary disclosure such as Naser (1998), Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995); Hossain et al. (1995), Al-Shammari, (2008) and Bradbury, (1992). Jensen and Meckling, (1976) found the voluntary disclosure level can reduce the agency costs by facilitating debt ratio suppliers assessment of the firms to ability to meet its debts ratio. In relation to this, Al-Shimmiri, (2008) argued that the companies with higher debt in their structure of capital are prone to higher agency cost, hence they will be more likely to disclose additional information in order to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry with shareholders. Alsaeed, (2006) argued that when firms increase their level of leverage, they have to disclose more information in order to reduce asymmetric information between the firm and its creditors. Hence he argued that firms with high leverage will have high level of disclosure. In addition, Zarzeski (1996) argued that firms with higher debt ratio are more likely to share private information with their creditors. Thus, voluntary disclosures can be expected to increase with leverage. However, Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, (1993), Hossain, Berera and Rahman (1994), Aitken, Hooper and Pickering (1997), Brennan and Hourigan, (2000) and Eng and Mak (2003) studied the relationship between the voluntary disclosure and leverage found no relationship. While Meek et al (1995) mention that there is negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and leverage for US, UK, and European MNCs, Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994). 2.4.3 Profitability Many studies refer the profitability as the factor that affects voluntary disclosure level such as Singhvi and Desai (1971); Foster (1986), Richard (1992), Meek et al. (1995) and Naser et al. (2002) they argues that when the level of firms profitability increase, the firms have to disclose more information that can be an indicator to good management and also have incentives to show to the investors and the public that their profitability has increased. However, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) identified 12 studies that investigated the relationship between profitability and disclosure with mixed results. Akerlof (1970) argued that larger profitable companies may disclose more information to be distinguished from less profitable companies. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argued the firms with larger profits are more interested in disclosing detailed information in their annual reports in order to justify their financial performance and to reduce political costs. However Wallace et al. (1994) found no significant relationship between the comprehensiveness of disclosure and the profit margin of listed and unlisted Spanish firms. Inchausti (1997) elaborated that agency theory suggests that managers of larger profitable companies may wish to disclose more information in order to obtain personal advantages like continuance of their management position and compensation. Raffournier (1995), Wallace and Naser (1995) and Alsaeed, (2006) observed no significant relationship between the disclosure and the profitability, because none of the performance related variables provides an explanation of the disclosure level. Ho and Wong (2001), Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006) and Barako (2007) on the other hand found profitability to be positively and significantly related with two of the four disclosure categories, financial and forward looking disclosures, whereas other categories ware negative and significant with the disclosure of general and strategic. This result is similar with that of Eng and Mak (2002) study on Singapore listed companies. For example, companies in the manufacturing sector were found to disclose less of financial information, and instead disclosed more on general and strategic information to explain in detail factors affecting their poor financial performance. 2.4.4 Ownership dispersion The ownership dispersion represents the percentage of shares owned by outsider after subtracting shares owned by the insider. Many studies found positive relationship between voluntary disclosure level and ownership, as explained by the agency theory which suggests that difference in the proportion of the companys shares owned by outsider shareholders causes differences in the voluntary disclosure level. This is because the companies with more outsider ownership are more likely to disclose more information than companies with less outsider ownership and also the demand for publicly available information is likely to increase (Wallace and Naser 1995). Gelb (2000) and Barako et al. (2006) found significant relationship between outsider ownership and disclosure level. Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981), Fama and Jensen (1983), Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, (1993) and Aitken et al. (1997) mentioned the detailed disclosure in annual reports that may allow outsider to monitor their interests more efficiently. Eng and Mak (2003) argued that voluntary disclosure is a substitute for outside monitoring and so is negatively related to managerial ownership. They found evidence consistent with this prediction. Many studies found negative relationship between voluntary disclosure level and ownership dispersion. Hossain et al. (1994) found evidence on Malaysian listed companies having significant negative association between voluntary disclosure and ownership dispersion. A later study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) also found similar result. Naser et al. (2002) examined the affect of ownership on US companys disclosure and his results indicated that firms with a lower level of managerial ownership are more likely to receive higher ratings for the disclosure provided in their financial reports. Ho and Wong (2001) found negative relationship between family ownership structure and voluntary disclosure. Chau and Gray (2002) also found negative relationship between family ownership structure and voluntary disclosure of companies listed in Hong Kong and Singapore but found positive associated with outside ownership. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) on the other hand found no evidence that ownership structure is related to disclosure level. 2.4.5 Audit firm size According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) large audit firms act as a mechanism to reduce agency costs and exert more of a monitoring role by limiting opportunistic behavior by managers and are less likely to be associated with clients that disclose lower levels of information in their annual reports. In terms of size, audit firms can be divided into two; large or small. Large audit firms are identified as being one of these Big Four (or Big Five or Six formerly) international auditing firms, and smaller audit firms are the rest; the firms are more likely to choose a Big Six auditing firm. Such choice of audit firms signals to investors that the contents of the annual reports are audited with high quality (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). Furthermore, the large audit firms are widely spread in the world while small firms are domestically; hence the large audit firms have more capability to disclosure of the information and have higher reputation and power to affect the voluntary disclosure level related to the smaller audit firm (Alsaeed, 2006). Several studies found that audit firm size have significant relationship with voluntary disclosure level. Firth (1979), Craswell and Taylor (1992), Wallace and Naser, (1995), Ahmed (1995), Raffournier (1995), Inchausti (1997), Mahmood (1999), S.M. Ho and Wong (2001), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Nasser et al. (2002) and Al-Shammari, (2008) found significant relationship between the voluntary disclosure level and audit firm size. Forker (1992) and Wallace et al. (1994) claim there are positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and audit firm size but not significant, while Hossain et al. (1994), Raffournier (1995), Wallace and Naser (1995), Depoers (2000) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) they didnt fine significant association. 2.4.6 Industry sector According Cook (1989) disclosure level is more likely to vary from one industry to the other due to the likelihood that leading firms operating in a particularindustry could produce a bandwagon effect on the level ofdisclosure adopted by other firms working in the same industry. Cooke (1992) found evidence that Japanese manufacturing firms tend to provide more information than other non-manufacturing firms. Other studies that found significant effect of industry types are Wallace and Naser (1995) and Camfferman and Cooke (2002), while McNally et al.(1982); Wallace (1987): Wallace et al. (1994); Raffournier (1995); Inchausti, (1997); Patton and Zelenka (1997); Naser (1998); Owusu-Ansah (1998), Naser and Alkhatib (2000) and Alsaeed (2006) found insignificant effect. Table 2.2: Summary of independent variables influence on voluntary disclosure: Study Independent variable findings Akerlof (1970) Profitability Positive relationship Singhvi and Desai, (1971) Profitability Positive relationship Jensen and Meckling, (1976) Debt ratio and audit firm size Positive relationship with debt ratio and audit firm size. Firth, (1979) Firm size and audit firm size Positive relationship with debt ratio and audit firm size. Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) Ownership dispersion positive relationship with ownership dispersion McNally et al.(1982) Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector Fama and Jensen (1983) Ownership dispersion positive relationship with ownership dispersion Watts and Zimmerman (1983). Firm size positive relationship with firm size Foster, (1986) Firm size, profitability Significant positive with firm size and found positive with profitability. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) Profitability positive with profitability Wallace (1987) Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Cook (1989) Industry sector Positive with industry sector. Bradbury (1992) Firm size and debt ratio. Significant positive with firm size and debt ratio. Richard, (1992) Profitability Positive with profitability. Forker (1992) Audit firm size Positive but insignificant with audit firm size. Craswell and Taylor (1992) Audit firm size Positively significant with audit firm size. Cooke (1992) Industry sector positive with industry sector Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, (1993) Firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion. Positive with firm size and ownership dispersion and negative with debt ratio. Hossain et al. (1994) Firm size, debt ratio, ownership dispersion and audit firm size. Positive with firm size and ownership dispersion but negatively with debt ratio and audit firm size. Wallace et al. (1994) Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Meek et al, (1995) Firm size, debt ratio, profitability. Positive with firm size and profitability whereas significant, negative with debt ratio. Hossain et al. (1995) Firm size and Debt ratio Significant positive with firm size and debt ratio. Mitchell et al. (1995) Firm size and Debt ratio. Significant positive with firm size and debt ratio. Wallace and Naser (1995) Firm size, profitability, Ownership dispersion Positive with firm size, ownership dispersion and industry sector but- ,audit firm size and industry sector Negatively with profitability and audit firm size. Ahmed (1995) Firm size and audit firm size Positive significant with firm size and audit firm size. Raffournier (1995) Profitability, audit firm size and industry sector. No significant with profitability and industry sector, but significant positive with audit firm size Zarzeski (1996) Firm size and debt ratio Positive with firm size and debt ratio Aitken et al. (1997) Firm size, Debt ratio and owner ship dispersion Positive with the firm size and ownership dispersion but negative with debt ratio. Inchausti (1997) Profitability, audit firm size and industry sector. Positive with profitability and significant positive with audit firm size and insignificant with industry sector. Patton and Zelenka (1997) Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Naser (1998) Debt ratio and industry sector. Significant positive with debt ratio but insignificant with industry sector. Owusu-Ansah (1998), Industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Mahmood (1999) Audit firm size Significant with audit firm size. Brennan and Hourigan, (2000) Firm size and debt ratio. Significant positive with firm size and significant negative with debt ratio. Gelb (2000) Ownership dispersion Negatively with Ownership dispersion Depoers (2000) Audit firm size No significant with audit firm size. Naser and Alkhatib (2000) industry sector Insignificant with industry sector. Ho and Wong (2001) Profitability, ownership dispersion and audit firm size. No significant with profitability but negatively with ownership dispersion and positive significant with audit firm size. Naser et al. (2002). Firm size, Profitability, ownership dispersion and audit firm size. Positive significant with firm size and audit firm size but positive with profitability and no significant with ownership dispersion. Eng and Mak (2002) Profitability No significant with profitability Chau and Gray (2002) Ownership dispersion Positively with outside ownership dispersion. Camfferman and Cooke (2002) Profitability, audit firm size and industry sector

Native American Cultural Assessment: The Cherokee Essay -- essays rese

The word Cherokee comes from a Creek word "Chelokee" meaning "people of a different speech." In their own language the Cherokee called themselves the Aniyunwiya or "principal people" or the Keetoowah, "people of Kituhwa." The Cherokee are perhaps one of the most interesting of Native American Groups. Their life and culture are closely intertwined with early American settlers and the history of our own nation’s struggle for freedom. In the interest of promoting tolerance and peace, and with regard to the United States government’s handling of Native affairs, their story is one that is painful, stoic, and must not be forgotten. The Cherokee people were a large and powerful tribe. The Cherokees' Macro-Siouan- Iroquoian language and their migration legends demonstrate that the tribe originated to the north of their traditional Southeastern homelands. Linguists believe that the Cherokee migrated from the Great Lakes area to the Southeast over three thousand years ago. The Cherokee language is a branch of the Iroquoian language family, related to Cayuga, Seneca, Onondega, Wyandot-Huron, Tuscarora, Oneida and Mohawk. Original locations of the Cherokee were the southern Appalachian Mountains, including western North and South Carolina, northern Georgia and Alabama, southwest Virginia, and the Cumberland Basin of Tennessee, Kentucky, and northern Alabama. The Cherokee sometimes refer to themselves as Ani-Kituhwagi, "the people of Kituhwa". Kituhwa was the name of an ancient city, located near present Bryson City, NC, which was the center of the Cherokee Nation. Long before Columbus discovered the "New World" or Spanish explorer Hernando de Soto arrived, the Cherokee territory stretched from the Ohio River to the north, and southward into Georgia and Alabama. Their homelands extended over 135,000 square miles. Cherokee villages had populations of about 350 to 600 persons. Before contact with Europeans, families built round, earth-covered homes for the winter. For the warmer summers they built larger, rectangular homes. The rectangular homes had upright poles forming a framework. The outer covering was bark, wood or woven siding coated with earth and clay. The Cherokee were primarily an agricultural people. They relied heavily on corn, beans, and squash, supplemented by hunting and the gathering of wil... ...r near the North Carolina reservation. Cherokee tribal governments have fairly liberal membership standards compared to other tribes. Some population estimates exceed 370,000, which would make the Cherokee the largest Native American group in the United States It is amazing that through European epidemics, attempts to assimilate eradicate and remove, that any Cherokee are left today. Despite all they have endured and lost, Cherokee levels of education and living standard ranks among the highest of all Native American tribes. I am proud to be an American citizen. I am also especially proud that my Mother’s Great-Grandmother, a descendant of Trail of Tears survivors, was Cherokee. BIBLIOGRAPHY Thomas E. Mails, The Cherokee People: The Story of the Cherokees from Earliest Origins to Contemporary Times Merwyn S. Garbarino, Native American Heritage The Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians http://www.charweb.org/neighbors/na/cherokee.htm James Mooney, History, Myths, and Sacred Formulas of the Cherokees Morris L. Wardell, A Political History of the Cherokee Nation 1838-1907 Collier, Peter. When Shall They Rest? The Cherokees' Long Struggle with America

The American Express Card

9-509-027 REV: APRIL 22, 2011 JOHN A. QUELCH JACQUIE LABATT The American Express Card Marketing is fully integrated into our overall strategy. Our largest investor, Warren Buffett, is very focused on brand health and customer metrics. — Kenneth I. Chenault In April 2008, Jud Linville, president and chief executive officer of U. S. Consumer Services at American Express Company, was preparing for a meeting with Ken Chenault, American Express’s chairman and chief executive officer since 2001, and Al Kelly, president of American Express Company.The purpose of the meeting was to discuss further growth prospects in the United States for the American Express consumer card business while maintaining the brand’s premium positioning. The performance of the American Express card, launched 50 years earlier in 1958, had been remarkable. By 2008, there were 52 million American Express cards in circulation in the U. S. , held by 41 million â€Å"cardmembers† (see Exhibit 1). American Express commanded nearly a 24% share of U. S. credit card payments. 1As Linville prepared for the meeting, he wondered whether he could continue to rely on the same business growth drivers that had served American Express well in the past. With the U. S. economy slipping into recession, the proliferation of cards in the market required American Express to deepen its consumer understanding to provide innovative, value-added products that would attract and retain cardmembers. Company Background The American Express Company was a leading global payments and travel company with revenue net of interest expense of $27. 7 billion in 2007, up 10% from 2006. American Express’s principal products and services included charge and credit card payment products and travel-related services offered to consumers and businesses around the world. American Express was the world’s largest issuer of charge and credit cards as measured by the annual value of purchases charged o n these cards. 3 Yet American Express maintained a â€Å"best-in-class† credit quality, reflecting in part the company’s traditional focus on the affluent segment, its expertise in evaluating the credit risk of individual consumers, and its ongoing commitment to investing in risk capabilities. In 2007, around 70% of American Express’s revenue net of interest expense and 85% of its pretax income from continuing operations5 was generated in the United States. The global diversity of the business included 86 million cards in force worldwide, more than 115 card-issuing or merchant-acquiring ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Professor John A. Quelch and Research Associate Jacquie Labatt prepared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion.Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective ma nagement. Copyright  © 2008, 2011 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-5457685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www. hbsp. harvard. edu/educators. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School..This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card arrangements with banks and other institutions, and over 650 American Express network branded products. 6 Fortune magazine ranked American Express the â€Å"Most Admired† megabank/credit card company in its 2008 annual survey. 7 American Express’s roots date back to 1850, when Henry Wells, William Fargo, and John Butterfield founded an express deli very company.The very nature of handling and transporting customers’ assets depended on security and trust, core attributes that had remained at the heart of the company and brand. In the late 1800s, American Express introduced financial products such as money orders and Travelers Cheques. The company later expanded into the travel business to further support its Travelers Cheques customers who were increasingly going abroad. The First Card The first American Express card targeting the business traveler was launched in 1958. The decision to enter this new business â€Å"faced strong opposition within the company with senior leaders evenly divided on the issue. 8 The debate began when the Diners Club card was introduced in 1950. American Express recognized the card as a potential threat to the company as consumers began using this card as a substitute for Travelers Cheques. 9 Some argued that a charge card would cannibalize the Travelers Cheque business, while others believed competing cards would hurt those sales regardless. There was further concern that launching a card would upset the American Automobile Association (AAA), one of American Express’s largest distributors of Travelers Cheques. At the same time, AAA was known to be considering launching a card of its own.Finally, with the economy in recession, many executives argued that it was a risky time to be launching a charge card. Nevertheless, in December 1957, American Express president Ralph Reed decided to launch such a card without further delay, stating at the time: â€Å"All we have to sell is service. † When word of the card’s imminent launch leaked, the company was inundated with calls from potential applicants. Further, the American Hotel Association approached American Express regarding forming an alliance, which gave the company an immediate customer base of 150,000 cardmembers and 4,500 participating merchants. 0 By the official launch date of October 1, 1958, Am erican Express had already issued 250,000 cards at an annual fee of $6 each, $1 higher than the fee for a Diners Club card. The first American Express card11 was targeted at businessmen on expense accounts, offering them a convenient method of payment rather than a means of financing purchases. This American Express card was a charge card that required the user to pay off the balance monthly. It was not a credit card that offered the user the option of paying interest on the balance as if it were a cash loan.The Gold (1966), Corporate (1966), and Platinum (1984) cards followed despite concerns over cannibalizing the original American Express card. This hierarchy of cards with progressively higher annual fees and services offered business travelers the aspirational prospect of being invited to move up from Green to Gold to Platinum. (In 1999, American Express added an unadvertised, byinvitation-only product, the black Centurion card. Equipped with VIP benefits such as a personal conc ierge, the Centurion card was offered by invitation only to a small, elite group of Platinum card customers.Celebrities and the very rich clamored for the right to carry this new card. ) American Express launched its first credit card, Optima, in 1987. The Optima card was the first American Express card to allow customers to carry a balance and pay interest. It was marketed only as a â€Å"companion† card to existing American Express cardmembers. A downturn in the economy in 1991 resulted in unexpected losses as some Optima customers failed to make their payments.As a result, American Express deferred plans to expand its credit card business and tightened its existing 2 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card 509-027 credit modeling programs and controls. In addition, American Express â€Å"card suppression,à ¢â‚¬  whereby merchants tried to dissuade consumers from using their American Express card, began with the 1991 â€Å"Boston Fee Party. † Boston estaurateurs were upset with what they viewed as American Express’s excessive discount rate, the percentage fee American Express charged merchants on consumer purchases made with American Express cards. This practice of not honoring the American Express card gained momentum and discouraged some consumers from using their American Express cards. Scale was viewed as a key competitive success factor in the payments industry; American Express considered its 16%—and falling—market share of the U. S. payments market in the early 1990s too low.With too few cards in circulation and too few merchants accepting the American Express card, American Express management faced a â€Å"chicken and egg† dilemma in trying to determine which aspect of the problem to address first. Turnaround Harvey Golub’s appointment as chairman and chief executive officer in 1993 set the stage for restoring health to the American Express business and brand. Golub became the â€Å"vocal guardian† of the American Express brand as he outlined his vision for the company: â€Å"To become the world’s most respected service brand. 12 American Express’s purpose was to manage, market, and promote the core attributes of the American Express brand, â€Å"trust, security, integrity, quality and customer service,† through educating employees, incorporating these attributes into card products and services, and reflecting them in all marketing communications. Future chief executive officer Ken Chenault, who was then running the card business, laid down three guiding principles: to provide superior value to customers, to achieve best-in-class economics, and to direct all activities to support the American Express brand.In addition, Golub established long-term goals as the guiding metrics for the b usiness: earnings per share growth of 12%–15% per year, revenue growth of at least 8% per year, and return on equity of 18%–20% on average over time. With a business strategy built on the company’s brand, Golub refocused American Express on the card business. Starting in 1981, American Express had purchased brokerage and financial advisory firms in an effort to become a â€Å"financial supermarket. † This strategy proved to be a distraction.By 1993, Golub had divested American Express of most of its non-core businesses. Concurrently, the U. S. card business underwent a significant review under the leadership of Chenault. He identified three issues: Costs were too high compared to American Express’s most efficient competitors; the division was too slow to change and adapt, particularly in introducing new products; and the organization was not sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of specific, more targeted consumer segments. 13 By 1995, signs of a turnaround were evident in the American Express card business.New card products began to appear with increased frequency, including proprietary and co-branded cards. A co-branding strategy was initially opposed by branding purists who argued that the American Express brand was too precious to be shared with a partner. This had led American Express to turn down an opportunity to co-brand air-miles-earning AAdvantage credit cards with American Airlines in the mid-1980s. The company came to regret this decision as American Airlines and, later, United Airlines both launched co-branded cards with Visa and MasterCard.The launches of the co-branded Hilton Optima card (1995) and the Delta SkyMiles American Express card (1996) marked the company’s new willingness to partner with other strong brands. In future years, agreements were also struck with Costco, Starwood, and JetBlue. In 1996, Golub decided to open the American Express network and invited other banks and institutions to is sue cards on its network. Doing business with other card issuers that were often competitors was a significant shift for the company. But, by carefully choosing the right partners who 3This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card would tailor American Express products for their high-spending customers, the company could efficiently supplement its own efforts to grow the number of cards-in-force, cardmember spending, and merchant acceptance. The Global Network Services (GNS) division was formed in 1997 to build these relationships.By 2007, there were more than 750 different American Express cards (including cards co-branded with merchants and banks) available around the world. Exhibit 2 lists the principal American Express card offerings and features in the United States as of 2008. In evaluating prospective produc t offerings, Linville asked whether the company was, first, â€Å"removing friction† from the system— making everyday life easier in some way for consumers such as with a â€Å"contactless† card—and, second, â€Å"providing special recognition,† or badge value, to cardmembers.Linville sought to make the American Express brand available more broadly while ensuring that it retained its premium status. Organization As of 2007, the company was organized into two major customer groups: Global Consumer Services and Global Business-to-Business Services. The Global Consumer group contributed 67% of the company’s revenues net of interest expense and 52% of its income from continuing operations. 14 Its range of products and services included charge and credit card products for consumers and small businesses worldwide, consumer travel services, and prepaid, stored value products such as Travelers Cheques and Gift Cards.Business-to-Business Services con tributed 29% and 38%, respectively, to the company’s revenue and income, and offered business travel, corporate cards, expense management products and services, network services, and merchant acquisition and processing for the company’s network partners and proprietary payments businesses. (See Exhibit 3 for a breakdown of company revenues by operating group and division, and see Exhibit 4 for income statement data on the company’s U. S. card business. ) U. S. Payments Industry Payment SystemsAmerican Express competed against all forms of payments for consumer purchases, a market that exceeded $7 trillion in the U. S. in 2008. 15 Payments could be divided into three broad categories: paper-based payments (checks, cash, money orders, official checks, Travelers Cheques); card-based payments (credit, debit, prepaid, electronic benefits transfer); and electronic-based payments (preauthorized and remote). Consumers were shifting from paper-based payments toward cards and electronic methods (see Table A).Converting even a small portion of the paper market to American Express payments represented a big opportunity. Many of these transactions were cash/check-based because either they were low-value transactions (at mom-and-pop stores) or high-value captive transactions where there was little incentive for the merchant (for example, a utility company or apartment landlord) to accept charge/credit cards and absorb the discount fees charged for the service. American Express estimated that around 25% of the cash/check segment represented high-value transactions such as car purchases, tuition fees, and rent/mortgage payments. This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card 509-027 Credit and Debit Credit cards held a leadership 26% share of the payments market and had grown 45% in dollar terms since the year 2001. Debit cards, which were issued by banks and allowed a purchase payment to be deducted immediately from the cardholder’s bank account, held a 14% share of the payments market and had grown 162% over this same period.Since American Express was not a bank, it did not offer debit cards. The average purchase per debit card in the U. S. was $39 compared to $87 per credit card purchase. 16 While debit card transactions were projected to exceed credit card transactions by 2011, the average purchase per credit card transaction was expected to remain higher. 17 Table A U. S. Consumer Purchases by Payment Type—2006 Method of Payment Paper Checks Cash Other $3,365 1807 1439 119 Cards Credit Cards Debit Cards Other Source: % Change Versus Previous Five Years Market Share -4 % -19 +23 -3 47% 25 20 2 3,048 1,871 ,010 167 +77 +45 +162 +209 43 26 14 3 751 443 307 +177 +136 +270 10 6 4 7,165 Electronic Preauthorized Remote Total Consumer Purchases (billions) +30 100 Adapted from The Nilson Report, Issue 890, October 2007. The average American adult carried 4. 4 payment cards in his/her wallet, be they debit, credit, and/or charge cards. 18 Competitors in the card payments business were either card networks that processed transactions (Visa, MasterCard), card issuers (primarily banks), or organizations that both issued cards and processed transactions (American Express, Discover Financial Services).Charge cards for specific retail chains were declining in importance. American Express aimed to increase its â€Å"share of wallet† by making American Express the payment card of choice for all transactions. This was especially important, as recent evidence showed the average number of cards per wallet falling rather than increasing; 20% of consumers shed payment products in 2007 versus 16% in 2004. 19 Further, only 31% of consumers were adding new payment products to their wallets, a drop from 56% three years earlier. 0 Many American consumer s â€Å"compartmentalized† their spending, using different cards for different types of payments. For example, some long-standing American Express members still used the American Express card just for travel and entertainment, and used a Visa or MasterCard credit card for other purchases. 5 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card Competitive Card NetworksPayment networks operated under two business models. â€Å"Open-loop† payment networks, as employed by Visa and MasterCard, were multiparty. Processing a payment typically involved connecting two financial institutions: one that issued the card (issuer) and one that serviced the merchant (acquirer). The open-loop network managed the information and transfer of value between the two banks. In a â€Å"closed-loop† network, as used by Americ an Express and Discover, the network â€Å"owned† the relationship with both the cardholder and the merchant.Leading payment networks are listed in Table B. Credit Card Networks—U. S. Market Share 2007 Table B Share of Credit Card Purchases Visa MasterCard American Express Discover Source: Share of Credit Card Transactions 42. 2% 28. 7 23. 8 5. 3 43. 8% 30. 5 18. 3 7. 4 Adapted from The Nilson Report, Issue 889, 2007. Visa, Inc. Visa operated the world’s largest retail electronics open-loop payment network. Visa provided financial institutions, their primary customers, with product platforms, including consumer credit, debit, prepaid, and commercial payments (see Table C).Visa operated a data-processing network that transferred transaction data and managed payment flow between issuers and acquirers. Visa generated revenue primarily from financial institutions based on fees calculated on the dollar volume of payment activity on Visa-branded cards (service fees) a nd from fees charged for providing transaction processing (data-processing fees). In 2007, Visa USA generated 82% of its gross operating revenue from service and processing fees combined. 21 U. S. Results for Visa, Inc. , Annual Product Performance (June 30, 2007) Table C Payment TypeConsumer Credit Consumer Debit Commercial and Other Total Payments Volume Cash Volumea Total Volume Total Transactions (in millions) Source: Payment Volume (billions) Share of Payment Volume by Payment Type $ 624 637 188 34% 35 10 1,449 79 382 1,831 21 100% 25,942 Adapted from Visa, Inc. , Form 10-K, December 2007. a Cash volume includes cash access transactions, balance transfers, and convenience check transactions associated with Visa. 6 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012.For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card 509-027 Visa went public on March 18, 2008, raising $19 bill ion in the world’s second-largest initial public offering (IPO). 22 The IPO created a cultural and business challenge: Visa had to shift its focus from delivering benefits to its partner banks toward maximizing profits for long-term shareholder value. 23 As stated in Visa’s 10-K report, â€Å"Many of our employees have limited experience operating in a profit-maximizing business environment. †24 Further, the proceeds of the IPO bought out the interests of the partner banks.As a result, the banks were no longer Visa’s partners and co-owners but were now Visa’s customers. MasterCard MasterCard (MC), which successfully went public in 2006, was a global payment solutions company that was similar to Visa’s open-loop network. MC’s primary sources of revenue were transaction service fees, data-processing fees, and assessments on gross dollar use (purchases, cash disbursements, balance transfers) of MC-based cards. In 2007, transaction fees a nd assessments represented approximately 74% and 26%, respectively, of the company’s net revenues. 5 Discover Financial Services Discover Financial Services (DFS) was the consumer credit and financial services division of Morgan Stanley until it was spun off to shareholders as an independent closed-loop payments network company in July 2007. Founded in 1986, DFS was the only issuer whose wholly-owned network operations included both debit and credit card capability. 26 DFS also offered a range of banking products, such as personal and student loans, certificates of deposit, and money market accounts. DFS’s primary source of revenue in its U. S. ard business was interest income earned on revolving cardmember balances. Other sources of revenue included late-payment, over-the-limit, and merchant discount fees. Like American Express, the company offered a rewards program to cardholders; under the Discover program, card users earned a cash-back discount on the value of thei r transactions. Competitive Card Issuers Competitive card issuers (largely banks) issued credit and debit cards, predominantly under the Visa and MasterCard brands, and were responsible for the pricing, positioning, and marketing of their co-branded cards.The top three banks accounted for more than 60% of outstanding bank-issued credit card purchases, as indicated in Table D. Card issuers competed on the basis of card features and quality of service, including rewards, number of cards issued and quality of users’ credit and spending, number of establishments accepting the card, success of target marketing and promotional campaigns, and the ability of the issuer to manage credit and interest rate risks through economic cycles. The primary revenue source for bank issuers was interest income earned on outstanding credit card balances.They acquired new cardholders by cross-selling cards to the customers of their retail branch networks and, increasingly, targeted high-spending con sumers, offering premium cards with enhanced services such as larger lines of credit, cash rebates, lower interest rates, and co-brand benefits with airline frequent-flyer programs. 7 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card Table D U. S. Credit Card Volumes by Card Issuer in 2007 Volume of Purchases billions) American Expressa JP Morgan Chase Bank of America Citigroup Capital One Discovera U. S. Bank HSBC Wells Fargo GE Money Other Sources: $459 317 263 222 106 90 65 41 37 27 87 Adapted from The Nilson Report, Issue 896, February 2008, except for American Express (American Express Annual Report 2007). a Do not include third-party business. Emerging Payment Networks New entrants offering nontraditional, convenient, technology-based payment methods were growing in number and importance. It was estimated that cr edit and debit cards generated approximately $200 billion in purchase volume from online bill payments in 2006. 7 New payment methods included online â€Å"aggregator† networks, such as PayPal and Google Checkout, and telecom providers that leveraged new technologies and customers’ existing charge and credit card relationships to create mobile payment solutions where the plastic card would not need to be presented to the merchant. PayPal used encryption software to allow consumers to make financial transfers between computers. 28 Similarly, Google Checkout, which accepted and processed existing payment methods such as American Express, Visa, and MasterCard, aimed to offer buyers a fast, safe, and convenient purchase experience.American Express Card Business Model The American Express â€Å"spend-centric† business model (see Exhibit 4) depended on increased cardmember spending. American Express’s primary source of income was â€Å"discount revenue,† revenue earned from fees charged to merchants for processing purchases made using an American Express card. The fee charged represented a percentage of the dollar value of these transactions. In 2007, discount revenue and card fees accounted for more than 70% of U. S. Card Services’ revenue net of interest expense (see Exhibit 5).The average American Express cardmember charged more each year than the average Visa or MasterCard credit card user. In 2007, the annual average purchase volume per American Express card of $8,360 in the U. S. was substantially higher than that for Visa ($2,470/card) or MasterCard ($1,960/card). 29 By accepting American Express cards, merchants benefited from attracting as patrons the higher-spending American Express consumer. As a result, American Express could justify a premium discount rate from merchants over its competitors.American Express invested this price premium in information systems that studied the purchase habits and inclinations of c ardmembers. These insights led to the development of targeted 8 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card 509-027 promotions, connecting merchants with interested American Express cardmembers who were in turn motivated to spend even more on their American Express cards.In this way, the spend-centric model became a virtuous cycle, benefiting cardmember, merchant, and company alike. From the outset, American Express targeted the affluent, high-spending consumer. â€Å"High-wallet† consumers were defined by American Express in 2007 as those who spent more than $30,000 annually using cards. Affluent consumers represented roughly 10% of card users but accounted for half of U. S. charge/credit card consumer spending. 30 American Express’s target consumer typically liked to travel, liked to be different, and lik ed special access to exclusive experiences.For many years the American Express consumer skewed slightly toward affluent, older men, a reflection of the company’s early targeting of the male business traveler. The company had successfully increased American Express brand penetration of affluent younger and female consumers. Unlike its transaction-oriented competitors, Visa and MasterCard, the American Express card always emphasized an aspirational lifestyle. An early example was the 1985 launch of Departures magazine for Platinum cardmembers who were active, affluent consumers.The Departures editor defined luxury not as status and privilege but in terms of quality and authenticity. Membership in a Lifestyle From the outset, American Express executives emphasized that the company sold not just a card but a relationship. The relationship involved a â€Å"membership† in which the company committed to providing the member with the following: Access (premium and exclusive ac cess and enhanced experiences for cardmembers), Advocacy (in merchant disputes, for example), Accountability (privacy of information, fairness in billing), and Affiliation (a sense of belonging to a community).Every American Express charge card included the â€Å"Member Since† designation on the front followed by the year the consumer became an American Express cardmember. To underscore the membership status of American Express consumers, the company in 1991 launched the Membership Miles program to motivate customer sign-ups, customer retention, and more frequent card usage. At launch, the Membership Miles program gave cardmembers one point for every dollar charged on the card and the ability to redeem points with seven airlines. The program was renamed Membership Rewards (MR) in 1995.Spending on American Express cards linked to MR averaged four times higher than that on cards without rewards activity. 31 Seventy percent of cardmembers used the MR program. Cardmembers enrolle d in the program were found to be lower credit risks as well as more profitable. 32 The company’s â€Å"data-mining† capabilities helped shape the MR program into an industry-leading loyalty program. For these reasons, American Express’s marketing spending on MR had grown at a compound annual growth rate of 24% since 2001, compared to an average 12% increase in marketing and promotion spending. 33 The MR program in the U.S. had more than 160 redemption partners34 and featured 29 airlines among its 250 merchandise brands. Analytics not only helped to determine whom to reach and with what offer, but also how rewards influenced loyalty. In 2005, the MR analytics team analyzed which members were more likely to redeem, in which categories, how many points they would redeem, and at what cost to the company. This research enabled American Express to craft a more appealing mix of reward offers, to predict more accurately the volume of demand for particular offers, and t o negotiate better deals with suppliers.Innovations such as â€Å"First Collection,† a luxury tier exclusively for U. S. Platinum and Centurion cardmembers that included redemption partners such as Tiffany and Lamborghini, and â€Å"Bonus Points Mall,† an online gateway to more than 100 retailers, were 9 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card examples of how American Express increasingly tried to match the nature and the level of rewards to what its members sought and expected.Data-Based Marketing As a card issuer and network provider, American Express had direct relationships with both its cardmembers and its merchants. â€Å"Data-based marketing† became a competitive advantage at American Express. Analyses of cardmember purchases enabled American Express to develop offers that boosted spending with particular groups of merchants. Open-loop competitors Visa and MasterCard could not match American Express’s data-driven capabilities because they controlled access to either the cardholder or the merchant data, not both.The purpose of data-based marketing was to develop insights and offers that would match members’ interests, drive charge volume, and increase loyalty to American Express. 35 The company did not use individual consumer data for marketing purposes but rather clustered cardholders into segments based on personal, financial, and lifestyle characteristics evident in the patterns of their transactions. Cardmember clusters might have greater than average spending in, for example, entertainment, dining, home, fashion, electronics, or automobiles.Cardmembers whose spending showed them to be more â€Å"passionate† about their homes might then receive offers from local homeimprovement retailers. The company also researched correlations across spending categories to identify potential partnerships. For example, research indicated that affluent consumers who owned at least one luxury automobile brand had a strong affinity not only to other luxury brands but also to consumer electronics brands, an above-average tendency to engage in skiing and antiquing, and a strong likelihood of owning a second, more practical vehicle.Data mining also enabled American Express executives to predict how spending behavior evolved through various â€Å"life stages† and increasing levels of affluence. For example, the company’s predictive model indicated that non-affluent cardmembers who made a single luxury purchase, such as a first-class airline ticket, were three times as likely to become affluent. Card upgrade offers distributed following a cardmember’s first luxury charge purchase resulted in response rates over 50% above normal. 36 Emerging ChallengesBy 2005, competitors had begun to imitate American Express’ s lifestyle platform with premium product offerings (e. g. , Visa Signature, MasterCard World Elite), exclusive experiential rewards (e. g. , MasterCard’s Unique Experiences program), and lifestyle advertising. Visa’s â€Å"Life Takes Visa† advertising campaign emphasized the â€Å"brand’s promise to deliver innovative products and services that empower cardholders to experience life and business their way and on their terms. †37 The quality of a card’s rewards program was increasingly important to higher-spending consumers.No longer did they evaluate rewards programs just on ease of earning and redeeming points. The variety and frequency of unique rewards (such as backstage access at a concert) were more and more critical. American Express had an edge over Visa and MasterCard owing to its cumulative expertise in arranging special events, but bidding wars for such opportunities were increasingly common. While continuing to emphasize relation ship and lifestyle over transaction, American Express had to broaden its merchant network to maintain its share of consumer spending.In 1990, 64% of 10 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card 509-027 American Express U. S. billings came from the travel and entertainment (T&E) sectors and 36% came from retail and other sectors. 38 This reflected the company’s belief that spending could be segmented into â€Å"business† and â€Å"personal. † American Express’s focus on T&E concerned Chenault and Kelly.They believed that, in the interests of scale, American Express had to expand its presence in the â€Å"everyday† retail market. This change in strategy was opposed initially, partly because it would necessitate launching more new products and, in the eyes of some traditionalists, weaken the brand. However, by 2007 the sources of cardmember spending had more than reversed, with everyday retail spending representing more than 69% of U. S. American Express card billings. 39 Marketing Communications Advertising CampaignsAmerican Express had a long history of successful, distinctive advertising that consistently stressed prestige, inviting consumers to join an exclusive club of cardmembers. One of the first TV campaigns, â€Å"For People Who Travel† (1969–1974), demonstrated how the American Express card is â€Å"All You Need† for your travel and entertainment needs. This was replaced by the â€Å"Do You Know Me? † campaign, which that ran for more than a decade, produced 125 commercials, and marked the beginning of the company’s strategy of using famous American Express â€Å"members† to sell cards to consumers. Do You Know Me? † used a variety of celebrities to highlight the special treatment and recognition cardmembers enjoy, the premise being that people with famous names don’t always have equally famous faces; anyone who carried an American Express card would be immediately identified as someone of note. In 1987, American Express premiered the â€Å"Membership Has Its Privileges† campaign, which highlighted the company’s superior service and showed how the card â€Å"not only facilitated the variety and enjoyment of a cardmember’s lifestyle, but that membership is also invaluable when emergencies arise. 40 To complement this television campaign, the â€Å"Portraits† print campaign was launched. Portraits underscored the message that â€Å"superior customer service, security, and convenience† were important American Express qualities that cardmembers relied on. Shot by celebrity photographer Annie Leibovitz, â€Å"Portraits† focused on a unique group of high-profile cardmembers. The company’s first global advertising campaign, â€Å"Do Mo re,† was launched in 1996 and emphasized brand attributes such as trust, customer focus, travel relevance, and financial insight.A variety of â€Å"product† commercials highlighted individual card benefits such as no preset spending, purchase protection, and global assist, while talent-driven â€Å"stories,† such as Tiger Woods’s â€Å"Manhattan† commercial in which he plays the world’s toughest â€Å"island† course—Manhattan—were intended to drive emotional relevance. In an effort to encourage everyday usage of the card, the â€Å"Do More† campaign introduced a series of ads showing comedian Jerry Seinfeld using the American Express Card in supermarkets and drugstores. In 2004, a new global campaign with the tagline â€Å"My Life. My Card. featured snapshots of the lives of celebrities, including Robert DeNiro, Tiger Woods, and Ellen DeGeneres. The campaign portrayed American Express cardmembers as exceptional pe ople no matter where they lived or what they did. The campaign was also the first to support both American Express’s proprietary and network businesses. John Hayes, American Express’s chief marketing officer, believed that the company’s history of tastefully portraying the rich and famous had provided it with an edge in attracting A-list talent. DeGeneres purportedly pointed to Seinfeld’s ads before signing on to do her own. 1 11 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card American Express launched its most recent campaign, â€Å"Are You A Cardmember? ,† in 2007. Hayes explained: â€Å"The new campaign continues the tradition of defining the value of belonging to the American Express community by showcasing some of our most exceptional cardmembers and the ways in which membersh ip works for them.But our latest campaign not only reaffirms for existing members why they belong, it also calls on nonmembers to consider becoming a cardmember. †42 See Exhibit 6 for a summary of American Express’s U. S. card advertising campaigns. Expenditures The company’s mix of marketing spending had changed to reflect the growing importance of targeted communication over mass mailings and the emergence of the digital world. Over time, spending on direct mail, while still large, had decreased along with spending on television advertising.Event/experiential marketing and Internet spending had both grown. American Express used direct marketing both to acquire new customers and to motivate existing members to upgrade. Traditionally, American Express sought new customer applications from outbound telemarketing, â€Å"Take Ones† (applications placed in restaurants and other retail establishments), and direct-mail efforts. By 2008, only 40% of successful ne w applicants still came from direct-mail solicitations and response rates had slipped well below 1%.By contrast, a significant portion of applications came from new channels such as the Internet, co-branded partner channels, and consumer-initiated phone calls to American Express customer service. The American Express website had become one of the company’s largest sources of new member applications. It allowed the company to leverage its datamining expertise to provide real-time consumer rewards and offers. The Web simplified the card selection/application process by guiding the applicant through card choices.Based on the applicant’s stated card feature priorities (fees, rewards, payment terms), the American Express website provided card product comparisons and recommended the most appropriate card options from American Express’s portfolio. The growing importance of the digital world was reflected in the company’s shift in media spending, as shown in Tabl e E. American Express Company—U. S. Card Media Spending Table E Share of Media Spend 2003 Media Type Online Share of Media Spend 2007 7% Television 19% 48 57 14 10 Print 23 13 Radio 2 Non Traditional Source: Mediaa Company records. a Non Traditional Media includes billboards, transit, cinema, and other out-of-home media Investing in the website reduced American Express’s costs and built brand presence and prestige. By 2008, 38% of American Express applications, payments, and reward redemptions had migrated to the Web at cost rates 53%, 84%, and 86% lower, respectively, than offline. 43 The Internet allowed the company to attract new customers faster (one application every eight seconds) and more 12This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card 509-027 economically. The website, serving as a virtual service cen ter around the clock, increased the frequency with which the company was in contact with its customers, making it a powerful marketing channel. Claiming the americanexpress. com site â€Å"gets more traffic than the Wall Street Journal online,† the company noted that its members used the Web primarily for checking statements and cashing in rewards.With more than 50% of American Express payments left to migrate online, upside opportunity existed for further cost savings and deeper relationships with customers. Bank and Merchant Partners As of 2008, American Express obtained customers in two ways: through direct company solicitations and communications that resulted in consumers being issued proprietary American Express cards; and through third-party financial institutions that solicited their customers to sign up for American Express cards through them, a business managed by the company’s Global Network Services (GNS) division.Bank Partners American Express’s GNS business was set up in 1997 to build partnerships with banks and other institutions to issue American Express–branded products. GNS products were designed to help issuers develop products for their highest-spending, most affluent customers and to support the value of American Express card acceptance with merchants. GNS enabled American Express to broaden its cardmember base internationally at relatively low cost. By 2008, GNS had over 120 partners in more than 125 markets and accounted for nearly 25% of American Express’s overall cardsin-force.American Express particularly wanted to help each bank design card products for their highspending, affluent private banking clientele, and to benefit from new distribution channels that included each bank’s website, direct-mail capabilities, and retail branch network. For their part, the banks were interested in partnering with American Express because of its superior marketing expertise as a card issuer and the higher-s pending profile of American Express cardmembers. Merchants stood to benefit from more American Express cards in circulation.For American Express, expanding the GNS business required little capital; the banks owned the receivables and therefore absorbed the consumer credit risk. While consumers could choose between American Express proprietary cards and those issued under GNS partnerships, cannibalization of direct sales appeared to be minimal. While GNS began building a healthy international business, it was effectively barred from doing business in the U. S. by Visa and MasterCard’s policies preventing their U. S. member banks from issuing other card brands. In 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against Visa, MasterCard, and eight of their member banks, charging anticompetitive practices. The suit charged that Visa and MasterCard prohibited their U. S. partner banks from issuing American Express–branded cards on the American Express network. Discover card s were affected similarly. The legal battle was resolved in 2004 when the U. S. Supreme Court let stand a court ruling that Visa and MasterCard had violated antitrust laws. Visa settled for $2. 25 billion. MasterCard later settled for $1. 5 billion.American Express soon signed Network Card License Arrangements (NCLs) to issue American Express–branded cards with seven leading U. S. banks. MBNA was the first, followed by Citibank, Barclaycard U. S. , USAA, GE Money, HSBC, and Bank of America. Though the banks were licensed to issue American Express–branded cards, American Express owned the relationships with merchants. 13 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y.SUN 509-027 The American Express Card This meant that GNS earned discount revenue from both the bank issuer and the merchant acquirer, a sum that represented roughly one-third o f total GNS revenues. This design feature underscored the importance of the continued focus on the high-spend segment. American Express developed strong account-management teams to manage the relationships with these major banks. Two major banks that had not yet signed on to issue American Express cards were JP Morgan Chase and Capital One. Merchant Partners In addition to U. S. anks, American Express depended on relationships with merchant partners, seeking always to expand its merchant coverage. These relationships were managed by the Merchant Services Group. Despite American Express’s premium discount rate, American Express believed that merchant coverage was not a function of price alone; if it were, Kmart and Walmart, for example, would not have chosen to accept American Express. Further, the Discover card discount rate was less than American Express’s yet Discover had a much lower merchant penetration. (See Table F for fees paid in 2005 by U. S. erchants to accep t card payments. ) American Express account managers and third-party sales organizations aimed to convince merchants of two benefits to offset American Express’s higher discount rate: that American Express cardmembers would spend more with them than with competitive cardholders and that American Express data mining could target promotional offers that would drive business their way. To persuade reluctant merchants to sign up, the Merchant Services Group might target members who were likely shoppers at a new merchant with double points promotions for an inaugural period.Since 2000, American Express increased merchant acceptance of its cards in many categories, especially quick-serve restaurants, mass transit, and health care. American Express card acceptance also increased in industries where cash, checks, or bank transfers were the predominant forms of payment, including apartment rentals, private jet travel, and destination clubs. By 2008, the American Express card was accep ted at millions of merchants in the U. S.. Management estimated that U. S. ocations where the American Express card was accepted covered more than 90% of American Express cardmembers’ general-purpose charge and credit card spending. 44 Table F Fees Paid by U. S. Merchants to Accept Card Payments—2005 Payment Card Brand Visa/MasterCard Credit Cards Visa/MasterCard Debit Cards American Express Discover Source: Fees Paid (billions) Weighted Averagea $25. 13 9. 76 8. 51 1. 46 2. 19% 1. 75 2. 41 1. 76 Adapted from The Nilson Report, Number 862, August 2006. a Fees vary according to merchant category, volume, and type of card. ConclusionBy the spring of 2008, American Express was strategically focused on the payments and travel businesses, having sold off the last of its banking interests. Michael O’Neill, senior vice president of corporate affairs and communications, explained this transformation: â€Å"We narrowed the business and broadened the brand. † Warre n Buffett, who was the company’s largest shareholder, described 14 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card 509-027American Express’s â€Å"powerful world-wide brand† as â€Å"an enduring moat that protects excellent returns on invested capital†45 and Chenault as one of the â€Å"giant-company managers whom I greatly admire. †46 In March 2008, Barron’s named Chenault as one of â€Å"The World’s Best CEOs† for having â€Å"positioned American Express well to withstand turbulence. He hasn’t compromised credit standards to gain new cardholders, nor has he cut back on marketing spending to prop up earnings. His loss rates on cards remain among the industry’s best. †47 In the second half of 2007, a U. S. housing downturn and credit crunch slowed U . S. economic growth.American Express issued a profit warning in early 2008. Chenault explained that the slowdown in cardmember spending that had come on suddenly in December 2007 was broad-based and was expected to continue into 2008. â€Å"Now we’ve been through slowing economies before, but none of us can recall such a dramatic drop over such a short time frame, except for the event-driven decline of 9/11. †48 Past-due loans and write-offs also rose, especially in parts of the U. S. that had experienced a housing price bubble. However, superior risk management and credit controls at American Express meant that it was less affected than competitors. 9 It was in this context that Jud Linville prepared for his meeting with Ken Chenault and Al Kelly. How could the American Express consumer card business continue its growth while maintaining the company’s premium positioning? Were there opportunities for his organization to serve U. S. consumers and merchants in n ew ways while continuing to turn in the profits that shareholders had come to expect? 15 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express CardExhibit 1 American Express Card Business Statistics: 2006–2007 Years Ended December 31 (billions, except percentages and where indicated) 2007 2006 Card billed businessa United States Outside the United States $459. 3 188. 0 $406. 8 154. 7 $647. 3 $561. 5 52. 3 34. 1 48. 1 29. 9 86. 4 78. 0 40. 9 29. 2 37. 1 25. 4 70. 1 62. 5 Total b Total cards-in-force (millions) United States Outside the United States Total Basic cards-in-force (millions) b United States Outside the United States Total Average discount ratec Average basic cardmember spending (dollars)d Average fee per card (dollars) d Source: 2. 56% $12,106 32 2. 57% $11,201 $32 Company documents. a Card billed business inc ludes activities (including cash advances) related to proprietary cards, cards issued under network partnership agreements, and certain insurance fees charged on proprietary cards. Card billed business is reflected in the United States or outside the United States based on where the cardmember is domiciled. b The number of cards that are issued and outstanding. Proprietary basic consumer cards-in-force includes basic cards issued to the primary account owner (â€Å"cardmember†) and does not include additional supplemental cards issued on that account.Proprietary basic small business and corporate cards-in-force include basic and supplemental cards issued to employee cardmembers. Non-proprietary basic cards-inforce includes all cards that are issued and outstanding under network partnership agreements. c Designed to approximate merchant pricing, the percentage of billed business (both proprietary and Global Network Services) retained by the Company from merchants it acquires, prior to payments to third parties unrelated to merchant acceptance. d Average basic cardmember spending and average fee per card are computed from proprietary card ctivities only. 16 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card Exhibit 2 509-027 Selected American Express U. S. Charge and Credit Card Products: 2008 CARD TYPE SELECTED FEATURES AND BENEFITS CHARGE CARDS Green (1958) Gold(1966) —Preferred Rewards Gold (2002) —Rewards Plus Gold (1994) Platinum (1984) Centurion (1999) One from American Express (2005) 1% of purchases deposited to high yield savings account CREDIT CARDSBlue (1999) —Blue (1999) —Blue Cash (2003) —Blue Sky (2005) —Blue for Students (2001) Optima (1987) —Optima Platinum (1997) City Rewards —In New York City (2004) —In Los Angeles (2005) —In Chicago (2005) Clear (2005) No annual fee, flexibility to pay over time, free additional cards No annual fee, earn up to 5% cash back, unlimited cash rewards No annual fee, earn points redeemable on airline, hotel or cruise services. No annual fee, flexibility to pay over time, Membership Rewards No annual fee, transfer balances for free, Membership Rewards No annual fee, earn Inside points to at, drink and play in New York No annual fee, earn Inside points to eat, drink and play in L. A. No annual fee, earn Inside points to eat, drink and play in Chicago. No fees of any kind, automatic rewards, flexibility to pay over time PARTNER CARDS Airlines —Gold Delta Sky Miles (1996) —Platinum Delta Sky Miles (2002) —JetBlue Card (2005) Hotels —Starwood Preferred (2001) —Hilton HHonors (1995) Costco—True Earnings Card (2004) Lifestyle Cards —The Knot (2005) —The Nest (2005) Earn Sky Miles on every dollar spent, earn double m iles on some purchases Earn Sky Miles, earn 1 companion ticket each yearEarn points towards JetBlue flights Earn points towards free hotel stays, upgrades, even flights Earn HHonors points on every purchase Earn cash back on purchases Membership Rewards, no annual fee, get special offers from The Knot Membership Rewards, no annual fee, get special offers from The Nest FOR CORPORATE CLIENTS American Express Corporate Cards (1966) Business ExtrAA Corporate Card (2003) Comprehensive reporting to track spending and increase compliance Savings through airfare rebates, free travel awards FOR SMALL BUSINESS Business Gold Rewards (2005) Business Platinum Card (1995) Plum (2006)Starwood Preferred Guest Business Credit Card (2001) Business Cash Rebate Credit Card (2003) Source: Membership Rewards, no limit, year-end summary Membership Rewards, access to special events Membership Rewards, access to special events, 5 free additional cards Airport Club access, 24 hour concierge service, by Invit ation Only events Save 3-25% on business expenses at selected partners (e. g. : FedEx, Delta) Access to airport lounges, professional office space, personal concierge Trade terms, pay within 10 days, get 2% off or defer payment Free awards nights at Starwood Hotels, awards flights on over 30 airlines Earn 2. % on all purchases and up to 5% for certain business purchases. Company documents. 17 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card Exhibit 3 Source: American Express Company Overview: 2007 Company records. 18 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card Exhibit 4 509-027American Express: Spend-Centric Model The American Express spend-centric busines s model focused primarily on generating revenues by driving spending on its cards, and secondarily finance charges and fees, allowing the company to grow market share in the payments industry. Source: Company documents. 19 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card Exhibit 5 American Express U. S. Card Services—Selected Income Statement Data Year Ended December 31 (millions)Revenues Discount revenue, net card fees and othera Cardmember lending revenueb Securitization income Excess spread, net Servicing fees Gains on sales from securitizations Securitization income, net:c 2007 2006 $10,435 4,762 $9,421 3,434 1,025 425 57 1,055 407 27 $ 1,507 $ 1,489 Total revenues Interest expense Cardmember lending Charge card and other $16,704 $14,344 1,518 964 957 767 Revenue, Net of Interest Expense $14,222 $12,620 Exp enses Marketing, promotion, rewards and cardmember services Human resources and other operating expenses Total Provisions for lossesd Pretax segment income Income provision 5,140 3,354 $ 8,494 $ 2,998 $ 2,730 $ 907 $ 4,445 3,227 $ 7,672 $ 1,625 3,323 $ 1,171 Segment Income $ 1,823 $ 2,152 Source: American Express Company Annual Report 2007, p. 53. a Discount Revenue represents revenue earned from fees charged to merchants with whom the company has entered into a card acceptance agreement for processing cardmember transactions. b Cardmember Lending Revenue represents the outstanding amount due from cardmembers for charges made on their American Express credit cards, any interest charges and card-related fees and balances with extended payment terms on certain charge products. Securitization Income, Net includes non-credit provision components of the net gains from securitization activities; excess spread related to securitized cardmember loans; and servicing income net of related dis counts or fees. d Provisions for Losses include credit-related expenses. 20 This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN The American Express Card Exhibit 6 509-027 Major American Express Advertising Campaigns in the United States 1958–early 1960s Good As Gold.The World Around! Establish prestige image for AmEx card and provide application instructions. 1969–1974 For People Who Travel Show how the American Express card is â€Å"all you need† for your travel and entertainment needs. 1975–1987 Do You Know Me? Show celebrities receiving the special treatment and recognition cardmembers enjoy around the world. Tagline, which continued through 1995, is â€Å"Don’t Leave Home Without It. † 1987–1992 Membership Has Its Privileges Introduce notion of â€Å"membership† and showcase the benefits of res pect, recognition, unsurpassed service as well as Global Assist, Buyers Assurance. 996–2000 Do More/Seinfeld Highlight individual card product benefits such as no pre-set spending, purchase protection, global assist. Talent-driven â€Å"stories† drive emotional relevance and recognition benefit. Use Jerry Seinfeld in a larger than life manner to increase awareness and use of the American Express card at everyday spend locations. Sub-campaign uses everyday moments to highlight individual product benefits such as retail protection and roadside assistance. Make Life Rewarding 2002 Relaunch American Express brand post 9/11 using charge card as the face of propriety.Sub-campaign introduced â€Å"revitalized† charge card with membership reward programs built in. 2004–2007 My Life. My Card. Demonstrate the company’s belief that American Express cardmembers are exceptional people no matter where they live or what they do. Featured extraordinary individuals including Robert DeNiro, Tiger Woods, Ellen DeGeneres, and Laird Hamilton, revealing snapshots of their lives. Acclaimed director Martin Scorsese and celebrated photographer Annie Leibovitz were commissioned to lend their vision to elements of the campaign creative.While the creative direction varied from ad to ad, the campaign theme was consistent: achievers of all types choose American Express. 2007–2008 Are You A Cardmember? Entice prospective cardmembers to apply and join the American Express community and reinforce the membership benefits to current cardmembers via showcasing the advantages American Express offers versus competition. Celebrities such as Beyonce Knowles, Ellen DeGeneres, Tina Fey, and Diane Von Furstenberg are featured within a lifestyle and access theme. Source: Company documents. 21This document is authorized for use only by YUJIE SUN in Intensive in American Business taught by Robert Calamai from September 2012 to December 2012. For the exclusive use of Y. SUN 509-027 The American Express Card Endnotes 1 Adapted from The Nilson Report, Issue 902, 2008. 2 American Express Annual Report, 2007, inside front cover. 3American Express Fixed Income Presentation, March 12, 2008, http://media. corporate-ir. net/media_files/ irol/64/64467/DebtInvestorPres. pdf, accessed June 12, 2008. 4 American Express Financial Community Meeting 2/16/2008 K.Chenault speech, texthttp://media. corporateir. net/media_files/irol/64/64467/KCSTalkingPoints020608. pdf, accessed June 12, 2008. 5 American Express Annual Report, p. 110. 6 American Express Fixed Income Presentation, March 12, 2008, ir. net/media_files/irol/64/64467/DebtInvestorPres. pdf, accessed June 12, 2008. 7 American Express Fixed Income Presentation, March 12, 2008, ir. net/media_files/irol/64/64467/DebtInvestorPres. pdf, accessed June 12, 2008. http://media. corporatehttp://media. corporate- 8 Americ